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[225]

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MR. MANT AND CAPTAIN CAMPBELL.—In the last Number of the Register, at page 203, I inserted an article upon the subject of the dispute between these two gentlemen, relative to the selling of prize goods and the granting of passports to foreign vessels in the Mediterranean.—I had observed, in a former article, that the matter divided itself into two parts, very distinct from each other. One part related to the conduct of Captain Campbell towards the parties whose goods and vessels were seized, or laid under contribution, and towards the nation whose ship he commanded, whose sailors were employed in the service, whose purses bore the expense of his enterprises, and whose credit and honour it was his bounden duty to maintain; or, at least, not wilfully to tarnish. The other part was of a nature comparatively insignificant, though not divested of sufficient importance to merit the serious attention of the public, as it involved a question of good or bad character of Mr. Mant, a gentleman of very respectable connections, and, until lately, a surgeon in the navy.—It is always disagreeable to me, and particularly at a time like the present, when subjects of such astonishing moment are presenting themselves every hour for the consideration of my country, whose future fate depends, perhaps, upon the events of the present month; at such a time, it is peculiarly disagreeable to me to enter upon matters originating in the disputes of individuals. But, seeing that I have entered upon the subject, and that if I leave it in its present state, I may be the means of doing injustice, I think it necessary to resume it here, and, with the aid of the information which I now possess, to place the whole of the case as clearly before the reader as I can; and, however deficient I may be found, in other respects, in the performance of this task, I trust that neither of the parties concerned will have any just grounds for charging me with partiality.—To the first branch of the subject, as being by far the most important of

[226]

the two, I shall first request the attention of the reader.—Mr. Mant, as was before observed, has published a pamphlet, which, he states in that pamphlet, to have been rendered necessary by the conduct of Captain Campbell, who had, it appears, shown to several persons at Southampton, certain papers injurious to Mr. Mant's character; and, who, it also appears, had refused to furnish Mr. Mant with any copy of those papers, though, it must be observed, that Captain Campbell did offer, in answer to Mr. Mant's request, to suffer the papers to be seen by any friend of Mr. Mant's; an offer which Mr. Mant refused, upon the ground, that, the showing of the papers to one person would not satisfy him after they had been shown to so many, calling upon Captain Campbell to cause the papers to be printed, and offering himself to bear the expense. To this proposition, Captain Campbell's relation, Capt. D. Campbell, who was now, it appears, the keeper of the papers, declined to make any reply; whereupon Mr. Mant published that pamphlet, to which I am now about to refer.—In his pamphlet, at pages 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, Mr. Mant makes the following statement.—“Captain Patrick Campbell has accused me of Peculation, &c. in my arrangement of the Prize Concerns, &c. of His Majesty's Ship *Unité* and others; and at the period which embraces the events in question, under the immediate command of Captain Patrick Campbell, of the said ship, then senior officer, commanding a squadron stationed in the Adriatic, intended for the blockade of the ports of Venice, &c. &c.—In the execution of this duty, numerous vessels of the enemy, as well as neutrals, were detained by Captain Campbell; and, being acquainted with the Italian language, I was directed by him, my commanding officer, to go on shore to the city of Trieste, for the express purpose of disposing or compromising for such vessels and cargoes as were then, or might thereafter be captured or detained by him, or by any of the squadron under his command, without having been pre-

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“viciously sent to an admiralty court for adjudication.—Not having been an accredited, but a voluntary and friendly agent to Captain Campbell in this business, and this was the prevailing idea of the squadron, from the knowledge I had of the Italian language, yet unacquainted with its routine, that it did not then occur to me that I was lending my assistance to the committal of an illegal transaction, a circumstance of which he himself could not be ignorant at the time he gave me the instructions.—In obedience to his orders, a negotiation took place with a Deputation of merchants mutually selected for this special purpose from the commercial chambers (i. e. Borsa, or Royal Exchange) of the city of Trieste, gentlemen of opulence and known respectability, and ultimately denominated as “The Deputation for the prize affairs of Corfu and Malta,” &c. &c. —Towards both these ports I was directed to hold out a menace, that detained vessels would be sent, if a pecuniary arrangement on their part was not made; which had the desired effect, by the speedy adjustment of the matter; the Deputation being well aware of the subsequent and great expense of litigations, &c. in a court of Admiralty: and as a further inducement for the Deputation to cause a liberal compromise, passports were generally given by Captain Campbell to each vessel; and, in several instances, a convoy was granted, to prevent their being again seized or detained.—Captain Campbell, conscious of his improper and illegal conduct in this affair, delivered to me a Bond, drawn up in his own diction and writing, with instructions for me, to use as a Form for those merchants to sign who agreed to a compromise, as a prevention to their instituting any process against him in any court of law:—but, unluckily for the Captain, he is not aware of the nullity of the Bond even at this moment; as, very probably, he may hereafter feel the ill effects of this designing caution.—In order to afford some proof to the public that Captain Campbell’s orders were enforced, for the compromise of the several vessels and cargoes, I declare the same to have taken place with vessels under the following flags; viz. Turkish, Grecian, Danish, Papal, Imperial, French, and Venetian; and, were I to state the names, the list would nearly reach the length of a certain Proctor’s bill:—but

“this must be added, they were of the construction of ships, brigs, trabaccolos, &c. &c. Documents of which are in my possession.—In the several compromises, &c. I have been acknowledged by the Borsa (i. e. Commercial Chambers, or Royal Exchange) to have made them on the most honourable and advantageous terms for the interest of my employer; and to exculpate myself completely from any charge of misconduct, or of appropriating any sum or sums to my own use and benefit, that I now declare, the specific sums stipulated in the several pecuniary payments were always (excepting in some very trifling cases, and this at the moment of emergency), in the first instance, submitted to the consideration, and, lastly, rendered valid with the concurrence of Captain Campbell, my commanding officer, or some other Captain, who were all in agreement of sharing monies obtained by this unwarrantable and illegal proceeding.—The various sums received on account of this practice were never collected by me; the Deputation sent the money to the office of the Vice-Consul at Trieste, which was delivered over to me in bags, sealed, and with a tally, specifying the amount, in order to deliver it to Captain Campbell, my commanding officer, on my returning on board; and which I was in the constant habit of doing, seeing at the time of delivery the amount counted and reckoned by Captain Campbell; and the distribution of this money was at no period intrusted to me.”—There is something so bold in these transactions; they display so grand a scale of action, that one can hardly believe it possible that they were illegal; and yet, I have examined the acts of Parliament in vain in order to find out something to warrant them. It is impossible for me to know what were the instructions given to Captain Campbell by the Admiralty; and, I do not pretend to say, because I really do not know, what is the law upon the subject. These transactions may, therefore, have been fully justifiable, in consequence of some instructions on the part of the Admiralty, or of some enactment by the Parliament; but, this, I say, that, if they had not one of these grounds to rest upon, they were neither more nor less than acts of *Piracy*. When I wrote the last article upon this subject, I had seen a paper, purporting to be a letter to the Lords of the Admiralty, the object of which was, to explain the nature of these

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transactions, and from the reading of that paper, I was convinced that the charge against Captain Campbell was wholly unfounded, my judgment, too, being in some degree biassed by the papers shown me with regard to the conduct of Mr. Mant, who had preferred these charges; but, I have now seen lists of vessels and divers other papers, to which, as it appears to me, that letter to the Admiralty does not give an answer; does not, sufficiently, explain.

—This statement of Mr. Mant's, in which, I repeat, is contained matter, affecting, and deeply affecting, the vital interests, and still more the honour of the navy and the nation, is in *print*, let it be remembered. It is in print, and its author pledges his character for the truth of it. He also puts in jeopardy his property and his personal liberty, if it be not true. Therefore, it is very desirable, that this statement should receive a flat and plain contradiction; or, that it should be shown, that the statement, if true, brings to light nothing unlawful. — There can, I imagine, be no difficulty at all in proving, by many witnesses, the falsehood of such a statement as this, if it be false; and as to the legality or illegality of the acts, that question might be settled at once by an appeal to the instructions, or to the act of Parliament, under which these sales of prize-goods and these compromises, as they are called, took place. I really should be very happy to be the means of promulgating a refutation of this statement altogether; for, there does, upon the whole, appear to be something so terrible in the acts alleged, that one cannot think of them without feeling some degree of shame for one's country.

—Captain Campbell is an officer of great merit in his profession; he long ago distinguished himself by his bravery; he was, I observed, highly praised in a public dispatch of Lord Collingwood, for his conduct in the Mediterranean; and, as I am informed, he is still very well thought of at the Admiralty. But, though these circumstances have, and ought to have, great weight, they could not, if they were fifty times as numerous and fifty times as strong, do away any one undeniable fact. — The fame of Lord Nelson; all his vigilance, all his skill, all his wonderful activity, all his bravery, all his honours, all his titles, of Baron, Earl, and Duke; yea, the loss of his life in the arms of the most glorious naval victory that ever was won; all these put together, do not, in the mind of any just, any generous, any merciful man, weigh as one

single feather against any one single fact, alleged by Captain, now Admiral, Foote, relative to the transactions, the ever-memorable, the indelible, transactions of the Bay of Naples; therefore, as a friend to the British navy, and, of course, in that view of the matter, a friend to Captain Campbell, I take the liberty to recommend to him a plain and full answer to this statement of Mr. Mant. — It may be said, that Captain Campbell is not bound by any rule of moral action to enter the lists in print with every person who may chuse to write and print respecting his conduct. This is very true: but, it appears from Mr. Mant's pamphlet, that it was not Mr. Mant who began the work of publication; for, Mr. Mant inserts the copy of a letter from Captain Campbell to him, in which letter Captain Campbell seems clearly to admit that he had shown papers, relative to these transactions, to several persons at Southampton, which was a sort of publication, not so general, indeed, as that of Mr. Mant, but still, it was a publication. And, it was a sort of publication, too, which was calculated better than any other to produce all the consequences that have followed. Captain Campbell, therefore, must, I think, be regarded as having given the challenge. He, in some sort, compelled Mr. Mant to publish, and if Mr. Mant did publish, it was absolutely necessary for him to state the transactions, or at least, some part of the transactions, the existence of which gave rise to Captain Campbell's charges against him. It appears, therefore, very clearly that Captain Campbell cannot refuse to meet Mr. Mant in print, upon the grounds above stated, and that his silence cannot fairly be attributed to a contempt of his assailant, with respect to whom he thought it necessary to promulgate charges. — Thus far we have viewed the transactions above mentioned solely as they relate to the commander; but, upon a supposition, that the statement of Mr. Mant with respect to those transactions, be true; upon the supposition that they were what he states them to have been, and that they were, as he says they were, "unwarrantable" and "illegal," we must not omit to observe, and to bear in mind, that Mr. Mant, according to his own account, had a pretty considerable share in them. He was the person who negotiated the compromises spoken of; he was the person who sold the prize-goods; he was the person who received the money, and who caused it, as he says, to be trans-

mitted to his Captain. He lays great stress upon the circumstances of Captain Campbell being his "commanding officer," and of his acting in "obedience to his orders;" but Mr. Mant was not a person likely to be uninformed of the fact, that he was not bound to obey any *unlawful* command of his commanding officer. Mr. Mant was a surgeon in the navy. The health of the crew depended, in some measure, upon him. The necessity, therefore, must have been very urgent which could have justified his being so long absent from his ship, upon any account; and, I should have thought that a person in his situation would have been likely to hesitate, and even to remonstrate, before he consented to leave the ship, to go and reside on shore, and that, too, in the not very respectable capacity of an agent in compromises and a vender of prize goods. He certainly was not, in duty, bound to take upon him this office; and, it is impossible that even his warmest friends can attempt to justify the act, even upon the supposition of his having been wholly ignorant of the illegality of the transactions in which he was concerned. Of this circumstance, he says in his statement, that he was ignorant at the time when he first accepted of the office. He does not say when it was that he discovered his error; but his friends must sincerely lament, that he did not, the moment he discovered it, make a communication, either to the Admiralty or to the commander in chief in the Mediterranean, of those transactions, which he had then discovered to be so unwarrantable and illegal, and in which, he had, through ignorance, taken so prominent a part. Yes, the friends of Mr. Mant must all sorely regret, that he reserved all communications of this sort, through a space of two or three years, and, until after Captain Campbell, as appears from Mr. Mant's own publication, had thwarted him in his wish'd-for appointment to another ship, and until, as is manifest, his resentment urged him to do that which his friends must wish to have proceeded from a sense of duty to that country in whose service he was engaged.—It is very certain, that, if the blame of these transactions were divided into a thousand parts, nine hundred and ninety-nine would fall to the lot of Captain Campbell, to whom the ship, her crew, and the interest and credit of the nation, as far as this ship was concerned, were confided; but, still, it is impossible, upon the supposition that the transactions were criminal, and so

grossly and scandalously criminal, as the statement of Mr. Mant gives us to understand, to excuse Mr. Mant himself from all share of the criminality.—Thus far with respect to the first branch of this subject, into which, I continue to think, that some serious inquiry is now become inevitable. The example is of so dangerous a tendency; the evil of such an example may be so great; the mischief that it may produce may affect the nation in so many ways, that, at any rate, it should be made apparent to all the world, that it has not the countenance of the government.—We now come to speak of the second part of the subject; namely, of the charges preferred against Mr. Mant by Captain Campbell, the substance of which is this: that the former, while he was employed as the manager of prizes and of compromises, received secretly sums for his own private benefit, no part of which, of course, he paid over to the Captain or crew.—In my first article upon this subject, I said, that I thought, that Mr. Mant had successfully defended himself against this charge. In my last Number, having, in the meanwhile, been shown two documents on which this charge rested, I stated the substance of them, the effect of which has been necessarily a strong suspicion, at least, that the charge was well founded.—This has very naturally brought from Mr. Mant an explanation of the circumstances connected with these unfavourable documents, and also an affidavit, which will be inserted at the foot of this article.—The documents here mentioned, relate to two separate transactions, in the first of which Mr. Mant is asserted to have taken the sum of 200 dollars from a person, to whom he sold prize goods, as a bribe to let that person have the said goods on advantageous terms; as a factor, or salesman, or commission merchant, might, if a rogue, take money of a purchaser as a compensation for defrauding his employer. This charge, if well-founded, is quite decisive of a man's character; and, I confess, that, with a view of only one side of the matter, I looked upon the proof as complete. But, upon hearing the explanation of Mr. Mant, my opinion is a good deal changed, and I must see further proof in support of the document before I regard him as guilty. I will now, however, submit Mr. Mant's explanation to the reader, together with such remarks as it naturally suggests, and then leave him to form his own judgment.—The document, upon which this most foul

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charge rests, is a *Declaration*, upon stamped paper, and made, apparently, before some magistrate or notary in Italy, and it shows, that Mr. Mant received 200 dollars "to cause ME," says the Declarant, "to have on advantageous terms the goods I bought of him."—Mr. Mant first observes, upon this document, that it is one of those very papers which Captain Campbell showed about Southampton, and of which he was refused a copy; and, that, though Captain Campbell had the paper in his possession for years, while Mr. Mant was in the ship with him, he, Mr. Mant, has never been allowed to see the paper from the day it was written to the present hour. He further observes, before entering on an inquiry into the nature of the evidence thus furnished, that he often pressed for a formal investigation of his conduct; that he asked to know and to be confronted with his accusers; and, that it is very strange that Captain Campbell should now think it proper to be his accuser and produce documents to criminate him, when he never thought proper to be his accuser with the government, never would bring the matter to a legal investigation, never would consent to confront the accuser with the accused, and would never even show Mr. Mant the document, on which the principal charge was founded.—The document, upon which the charge is founded, is signed, I think, by *Joseph Jursovich*; but of this I will not be certain. Mr. Mant states, that this was the name of the man, who, as he was informed afterwards, was his accuser.—The affidavit of Mr. Mant positively denies the fact; and to that affidavit the impartial reader will give, of course, all the credit that is due to it, bearing in mind, too, that it has been made in the place where Mr. Mant resides, and under the very eye of his circle of friends and acquaintances.—But, yet, this will not be sufficient in the way of exculpation; for, if it were, we must adopt the principle, that the evidence of the accused is to be admitted in his own defence, a principle contrary to all the practice of the world and to the dictates of reason and of nature.—Something, therefore, is wanted to show the want of credibility in the evidence, and this, I think, Mr. Mant does furnish, and especially if we take into view the circumstance of the informer having been a party concerned in the foul transaction, of which he gives evidence.

—Mr. Mant states, that this *Jursovich* was a very low man, the master of a coast-

ing vessel of about 8 or 10 tons; that, secondly, he was under the influence of one *Haire*, a person employed by Captain Campbell as a pilot, in Italy, and that this *Haire*, having been reproved by Mr. Mant some time before for most indecent conduct on board the ship, swore, in the hearing of an officer, that he would do Mr. Mant all the injury he possibly could, of the truth of which fact Mr. Mant produces a proof in a *Declaration* (legally taken in London) attested by the said officer, whose name it is not necessary to mention; that *Haire* was, at the time alluded to, become the agent in the prize and compromise transactions, and that *Jursovich* was his assistant in the business; that Captain Campbell never even mentioned to Mr. Mant any thing of *Jursovich's Declaration*, until about a year and a half after it was made, and after it was in the Captain's possession; that, at the time when the *Declaration* of *Jursovich* was made, the ship was in the *Adriatic*, and that the whole of the parties were then within reach of the other, and might have been confronted, but that, at the time, when Captain Campbell first talked of the *Declaration* to Mr. Mant, the ship was near *Malta*, and, of course, out of the reach of the party who made it, as has been before stated by him in his pamphlet at pages 42 and 43, where, together with pages 44 and 45, the whole of this matter will, he says, be found to be fully explained; that, Captain Campbell never showed the *Declaration* to Mr. Mant; that Mr. Mant earnestly requested the Captain to cause a formal investigation of all these matters to take place, but that this Captain Campbell never did, saying, that he was convinced that the fellow was not to be believed, and that he, Captain Campbell, should destroy the *Declaration*. Such is Mr. Mant's statement in answer to the charge laid against him by *Jursovich*, and such, in substance, is his affidavit. The public, like me, will, of course, in estimating the value of a declaration of this, or of any, sort, pay attention to the circumstances under which it was made; and, it must be confessed, that the circumstances here are very material. The character of the person declaring, the situation in which he was, his not declaring upon oath, his very close connexion with *Haire*, his interest conjointly with that of *Haire*, are all circumstances, which, unless they can be proved not to have existed, must necessarily make greatly in favour of Mr. Mant;

but, then, it must, on the other hand, be observed, that this is the statement of Mr. Mant himself; it is the evidence of the accused in his own defence; and, it, supposing it all to be true, rests upon the fact (for which my memory does not warrant me in vouching), that the name of the Declarant was *Joseph Jursovich*.—But, we now come to the *internal evidence*, not depending upon the word of any man; evidence against the credibility of the Declarant, furnished by the Declaration itself. —I confess, that my last article, above referred to, was sent to the press without sufficient reflection. The documents shown to me produced a feeling in my mind not favourable to the right operation of reason. If this had not been the case, it would have occurred to me, as, I hope, it must have occurred to my readers, who had more time for reflection, that, supposing the document to state truth, the Declarant himself must have been a dishonest man; for, if it was dishonest or dishonourable in Mr. Mant to take the two hundred dollars, it was not less so in Jursovich to give the two hundred dollars. The sum was in the nature of a bribe, and in all cases of bribery, the briber is looked upon as the most criminal of the two. One would, indeed, more readily excuse, or rather, be less disposed to wonder at, such conduct in a man like Jursovich, than in a man in Mr. Mant's situation in life; but, in whatever degree we are inclined to excuse him on account of the groveling nature of his mind and habits, in that same degree we must, in justice to Mr. Mant, deduct from the credit due to the declaration. We know, that the evidence of accomplices is, sometimes, regarded as sufficient, but, then, there must be strong circumstances to back it, and the probabilities of the case must be decidedly in favour of the truth of such evidence, which they certainly are not in the present instance. —It is very natural to ask, why the Declarant, who had got, as he says, the benefit of the sale of goods to him, in consequence of a bribe, should go to Captain Campbell and give information of his own rascality; why, he should go and declare himself to have been a villain? It is impossible to suppose that he would have done this, without some very powerful motive, and some motive of self-interest, too; and, is it very likely, that a man, who was not ashamed to declare, and put his name to it, that he had been a villain, should scruple to declare what

is a man, who acknowledges himself to have committed, for selfish and base purposes, a most roguish act, to be believed against another, upon his simple declaration, unsupported by any other witness, or by any fact in corroboration of the charge? The decision of this question I leave to the impartial mind of the reader, who will, however, not fail to take into view the very important circumstance, that Captain Campbell kept the knowledge of the Declaration from Mr. Mant for a long time, and until the parties were at so great a distance from each other as to make it impossible to confront them; and, further, that he, as appears from the pamphlet, declined letting Mr. Mant have a copy of the Declaration even after it had been shown about Southampton. From these facts, which appear, even from his own letter, if a correct copy of it be given by Mr. Mant, to be undeniable, it would seem to follow, that Captain Campbell himself did not think, for a long while, at least, very highly of the credit due to this document, which aims such a deadly thrust at the character, at the common honesty, of Mr. Mant: and, I submit to every candid man, whether, if it was not thought necessary to confront Mr. Mant with his accuser, if it was not thought necessary to bring him to trial, if it was not thought necessary, afterwards, even to let him see and have a copy of his accusation, it was, or could be, necessary or right, to promulgate that accusation through the circle of his friends and acquaintances. —Therefore, after a cool and impartial review of all these circumstances, I must say, that the evidence of this Declarant appears to me to be worth little or nothing at all; and that, as far as relates to this principal and most odious charge, the accusation against Mr. Mant must be regarded as unsupported by proof, and, of course, as without foundation.—The other charge against Mr. Mant, as stated in my last article was this: that, by means of an interlineation in a passport, granted by Captain Campbell, the former extended the license of a trading vessel, and that he received three hundred dollars for so doing, which he kept to himself. —The extending of the license we must set down amongst the other illegal transactions, if they were illegal; and, really, amongst the mass, this appears, in itself, a trifle, unworthy of any particular mark of disapprobation. Mr. Mant, in his affidavit, says that he made the interlineation with the Captain's consent; but, if the great



mass of the transactions, described by Mr. Mant, were such as he describes them to have been, the mere alteration, or even the fabrication, of a passport, or a license, can only be looked upon as part of a wide-sweeping system, in the carrying on of which he was concerned, but of the illegality of which he solemnly asserts his ignorance. It is the taking of the three hundred dollars for the interlineation; or, more properly speaking, the keeping of them to himself, that forms the sting of the charge, and, especially with those, who are disposed to excuse the transactions in general.—But, even in this light, the charge falls greatly short, in point of dishonesty, of the foregoing one. There he was accused of taking into his own pocket, in the shape of a bribe, money due to his Captain and shipmates. Here he is accused of taking money to himself indeed, but money, which, or the worth of which, his shipmates had never possessed, and would never have possessed, if he had not taken it.—This was, as it appears from the representation on the other side, one of those transactions which but too often occur between those who have power and those who have money, and who have a mutual desire to soften the rigour of instructions, regulations, or law.—But, still, we must hear the explanation of Mr. Mant; and see on what sort of *evidence* this second charge is founded.—There were, as relating to this transaction, two documents mentioned by me, one in Mr. Mant's hand-writing, but not signed. It was a declaration drawn by him to be signed by Pazzi, the person who had received the interlined license, certifying that Mr. Mant had not received three hundred dollars from him. This paper, of itself, made nothing at all in support of the charge, and Mr. Mant very naturally accounts for its having been drawn up, and having been put into the hands of Captain Campbell by Haire, or his associates, without ever having been even tendered to Pazzi, who was on shore, and to whom Mr. Mant was not permitted to go.—The other document, and the only one in support of this charge is, the Declaration, shown to me, and mentioned in my last Number, of a *third party*, who declares, that he was present, when Mr. Mant offered Pazzi to return him the 300 dollars, if he would sign the above-mentioned certificate of not having paid them.—As to this document, Mr. Mant states, that it ought to have been shown to him at the

time when his accuser might have been confronted with him; that, as the act charged was very criminal, Captain Campbell ought to have caused inquiry to be made into it on the spot, where the parties all were. He asks, *who this third person was?* and I do not recollect; he asks, why Pazzi's evidence was not taken? he asks, if Pazzi refused to sign the certificate, and rejected the offer of the 300 dollars, made by Mr. Mant in person? how could it happen that Mr. Mant should leave the certificate with him, and should not take it away? he asks, if Pazzi carried the certificate back to the ship, why a declaration was not taken from him, and why he was not immediately confronted with Mr. Mant? he asks, if Pazzi did not carry it back, who told the Captain that it ever had been presented to Pazzi? he asks, whether it be likely that such an offer should be made in the presence of a third party, especially when the intention must have been to smother a disgraceful transaction? he asks, whether a man, who, for the sake of lucre, could give 300 dollars in the shape of a *douceur*, was likely to refuse to take them back again in the shape of hush-money? and, above all things, he asks, how Captain Campbell, if he deemed the Declaration of this third party to be good evidence, could reconcile it to any sense of his duty as a Commander, or to any principle of justice as a man, not to bring him, Mr. Mant, to trial, not to confront him with his accuser, and never, even to this hour, to show him the Declaration, or make him acquainted with the name of the Declarant?—To these questions I can, I confess, see no answer; and, from the very nature of the thing, I think, that it appears that Mr. Mant has given the true history of this paper; namely, that he sent the paper open from the quarter-deck, that it was never presented to Pazzi, and that Haire, or some of his associates, brought the paper on board to Captain Campbell.—I am sorry that I cannot recollect the *name of the third party*; but, the credibility of his testimony is furiously shaken by the circumstances of the case; for, if it be true, Mr. Mant must not only have made the offer in the presence of a third party, a fact hardly to be believed; but, he must also have voluntarily been guilty of that supreme act of folly, the *leaving of the certificate* in the hands of a person, whom he must then necessarily have regarded as one resolved to give information against him.—This is too much to be believed by

any one; and, therefore, I am pretty certain, that the public will agree with me, that the allegation is unsupported by any thing like proof, and, of course, that Mr. Mant stands acquitted of the charge.—I have now only to add, that I was in error, when, in my last, I supposed, that Mr. Mant had been *displaced*, or *dismissed*, from the Navy, on account of these transactions. I have now seen a letter from the Transport Board, showing that his discontinuance upon the half-pay list as a surgeon of the navy, was owing to his having become a lieutenant in the militia service.—The affidavit of Mr. Mant should be read with attention. The reader will take into his consideration the circumstances under which this affidavit has been made; he will bear in mind, that it has been made under the eye of Mr. Mant's friends, and in the place where he resides; that it is a solemn proceeding, which, in case of the refutation of any part of the facts, must consign the person swearing, to everlasting infamy; and, that, when Mr. Mant made the affidavit, he must have been sensible, that, if refutation was possible, it would not fail, first or last, to take place.—I have now endeavoured to place the whole of this subject fairly before my readers. I have not wilfully mistated or discoloured any fact; I have made no attempt to strain any argument; I have acted under no feelings of partiality; and, if I have omitted many things, which would have struck the mind of an advocate on either side, I shall rely on the penetration and judgment of every candid reader to supply the deficiency.

MR. MANT'S AFFIDAVIT.

"THOMAS MANT, late Surgeon of His Britannic Majesty's frigate, *Unité*, now residing at the Town and County of the Town of Southampton, maketh Oath, and saith as follows: That it is only since this Deponent's pamphlet was offered to the consideration of the public, as a refutation of certain calumnious reports tending to injure this Deponent's character, that he has been made acquainted with the whole tenor and extent of such reports, Captain Campbell, late commanding the said frigate *Unité*, having previous to such publication only *privately* exhibited papers of that tendency: That as the charges now appear in a weekly publication, and as it seems that this Deponent's pamphlet has not so satisfactorily rebutted the said reports, in consequence of the clandestine manner of their circulation, as otherwise might have been effected from the truth of its contents; and this Deponent having promised an immediate and honorable refutation to any charges which the said Captain Campbell should come forward with: Therefore this Deponent doth now, in regard to the first and second charges contained in the said weekly publication; viz. of his, this Deponent's, 'having

'taken money for himself in an *unfair* way for 'passports,' voluntarily make oath, That he never in any one instance received any sum or sums of money on these accounts, or for any other whatsoever, appertaining to the prize affairs of the Adriatic squadron, nor did he ever issue a passport to any person whatever, but such as had always the said Captain Campbell's approbation and signature: and this Deponent further maketh oath, That in regard to the third charge contained in the said weekly publication, of the interlineation of a passport, with the words 'to return with merchandise,' the said Captain Campbell permitted such words to form a part of the passport, and which interlineation was made, and passport given, as a compliment to a gentleman at Trieste, for the trouble and attention he had in arranging some part of the prize affairs of the aforementioned squadron: and this Deponent further saith, That he now holds two original letters to that effect, one addressed to the said Captain Campbell, and the other to him, this Deponent: and this Deponent further saith, That the said Captain Campbell granted passports containing the same permission, as was interlined in the before-mentioned passport, to four other gentlemen, who had also been instrumental in arranging some of the prize affairs of the said squadron at Trieste, to each, one passport or more, chiefly to load with oil and merchandise from Paglia, in the Adriatic, and other ports where British ships were not permitted to enter, and to return with their cargoes to Trieste: and this Deponent also, in regard to the last charge contained in the said weekly publication, viz. That 'when the Master of the vessel returned to Mr. Mant, he drew up a paper,' further maketh oath, That he, this Deponent, hath not at any period or place whatever ever seen or conversed with the Master of the said vessel (Padron Pazzi) since the passport first herein-mentioned was delivered to him at Trieste, and which was prior to the said Master's application to the said Captain Campbell for fresh passports: and this Deponent further saith, That with respect to the paper which appears in this Deponent's own hand-writing: it was written in consequence of his having heard it reported (but not then from the said Captain Campbell) that the said Master of the said vessel had paid this Deponent three hundred dollars for the interlineation of the passport: That on hearing such report, this Deponent not being permitted by the said Captain Campbell to go on shore, desired a person to call on the said Master and request his attendance on board the said frigate *Unité*, to know if he had circulated such report: in answer to which message, the said messenger brought word to this Deponent, that the said Master said, he could not come on board, but denied having said any thing of the sort; and said, he was willing to subscribe his name to any paper this Deponent would draw up which would refute such a charge, when the Deponent wrote the said paper before-mentioned, and gave the same open to the said messenger publicly on the quarter-deck of the said frigate, with directions to carry the same to the said Master of the said vessel for his signature: and this Deponent further saith, That the said paper so sent as aforesaid was, as this Deponent verily believes, intercepted by one Samuel Haire (styled in this Deponent's before-mentioned pamphlet as the incapacitated Pilot) who carried the same, unsigned, to the said Captain Campbell; and this Deponent

further saith, That the said Samuel Haire had sworn, that 'he would do this Deponent all the injury he possibly could; and, if money could buy it, he would buy every one at Trieste to prove this Deponent dishonorable in arranging the Unité's prize concerns,' or words to that effect: and that the said Samuel Haire was heard by these officers to use the above expressions; and that such expressions were so used by the said Samuel Haire, in consequence of this Deponent's having reproved the said Samuel Haire for his conduct in the mess-room on board the said frigate Unité; and which conduct of the said Samuel Haire, one of the said three officers, in an attested declaration in this Deponent's possession, is represented as being *too indecent for public detail*: and this Deponent further saith, That it was eighteen months or more after this Deponent heard the said reports of the said charges against him, that the said Captain Campbell, on being ordered to join Lord Collingwood, then the Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean, to explain reports of this nature, which his Lordship had heard, first spoke to this Deponent concerning them; and this Deponent having explained to the said Captain Campbell the circumstances of the before-mentioned several charges, he appeared perfectly satisfied, and desired the officers on board his said frigate to suspend their opinions thereon: and this Deponent further saith, That the said Captain Campbell, talking of Jos. Jursovich, the person by whom the said first mentioned charge was made, said, that he was a blackguard, and that he, Captain Campbell, could not take his word, and would therefore destroy the declaration he had made, which declaration this Deponent never saw; and that the said Captain Campbell also said, that he had no better opinion of the business of the said Master of the vessel (Padron Pazzi) than he had of the said Jos. Jursovich's, and should treat it in like manner, although the said Captain Campbell shewed this Deponent the said passport, in which the said interlineation was inserted, and permitted this Deponent to take a copy thereof: and this Deponent further saith, that the said Captain Campbell read to him, this Deponent, an extract of a letter from the said Captain Campbell to the said Lord Collingwood on the subject, wherein the said Captain Campbell expressed himself in words to the following effect:—And after a strict and diligent search into the business for nearly eighteen months, I have not been able to find any thing to criminate him, meaning this Deponent: and this Deponent further saith, That he quoted the above extract in a letter which he wrote to the said Lord Collingwood on this Deponent's soliciting his Lordship's attention to, and adjudication of the charges in question, and that no investigation was ever ordered by his Lordship. And this Deponent further saith, That the said Padron Pazzi, and the said Jos. Jursovich, were both under the influence of the said Samuel Haire, who conducted the Prize Affairs for the said Captain Campbell about eighteen months after this Deponent had found out the illegality of these transactions, and refused to act further therein.

THOMAS MANT.

Sworn at the Town and County of Southampton, the 15th day of February, 1814, before me,
THOMAS RIDDING, a Master extraordinary in Chancery.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.

BATTLE OF BRIENNE.—It seems that Buonaparté has met with another terrible defeat, which, if we believe the *Courier* and the *Times*, must be attended with consequences more fatal to his dynasty than any of his former disasters, because it has taken place in the heart of France, by which a direct communication has been opened to his capital. I was much surprised, however, to find that neither the Park nor the Tower guns were ordered to be fired, in celebration of an event so gratifying, so joyful to the good people of England. Lord Burghersh tells us, in his dispatches, that it was a *most glorious victory*. Sir Charles Stewart says, that "if Marshal Blucher was not long ago immortalized, this day would have crowned him in the annals of fame;" and the whole tribe of hireling journalists were so intoxicated with the news, that language was incapable of describing their ecstatic feelings. The money gamblers, and other "gentlemen and men of honour," who frequent the Exchange, were particularly rapturous on this occasion. They thought of nothing but the "most glorious victory;" it was the predominant theme of their conversation; and I have no doubt it was the object of their nightly visions. Their favourite journals kept ringing the changes upon the immortalizing intelligence; and if any one ventured, even by a look, to indicate a doubt upon the subject, he ran the risk of being horse-whipped, at least, by these "gentlemen and men of honour." Yet in the midst of all this exultation; with the official details in their hands of this "most glorious victory," and that, too, "on the territory of France," not a single gun was fired, not a chime rung, nor a solitary candle lighted up, to commemorate the event. The other day the citizens of London were gratified with the roaring of the Park and Tower guns, in return for the high honour conferred upon the country by the Danes, who had graciously condescended to accept of £200,000 of our money. It is true, the Crown Prince, who had armed against his native country, and helped us to get rid of this troublesome article, compelled the Danes to give up to Sweden a part of their territory; but for this we had previously given his Royal Highness an entire island. It was not said that either we or the Allies gained a "glorious victory," or even any victory at all, by the Danish arrangement. We, good souls, rejoiced,

merely because another opportunity was given us of *parting* with our money. If when we entered into treaty with the *valiant* Prince of Sweden, our views were *then* directed to something beyond a settlement with Denmark; if we *then* calculated upon the Crown Prince marching with his army to assist the *Allies* in the invasion of France, or to co-operate with our *own* troops in completing the deliverance of Holland, it *now* appears that these calculations were not well founded; for, whether he disapproves of the proceedings of the other Powers, or whether, having *obtained* the object he had in view he is now solely occupied with *securing* it, it is clear that Bernadotte has not performed any achievement worthy of notice, or shewn any anxious disposition to bring forward his army, since the signing of the treaty with Denmark. But so it is, that we did rejoice, that we did fire the Park and the Tower guns on that event being announced. How is it, then, that nothing of this nature occurred when we heard of the late "most glorious victory" which had been obtained over the enemy "on the territory of France?" How is it that those who have the management of these matters should have thrown such a *damp* upon public feeling? Did they *believe* the dispatches of Lord Burghersh, or did they regard it a matter of *greater* importance that Denmark should accept £200,000 of our money, than that Buonaparté should be completely *defeated* in the very heart of France?—To me it seems that this alleged *victory* has not received that *implicit credit* in every quarter which it has done on the Stock Exchange, and which our prostituted press has endeavoured to obtain for it among the credulous multitude. It is only in this way that I can account for restraining the public rejoicings usual on such occasions; and when I look into the official details now before me, in which I find both parties, Buonaparté on the one hand, and Lord Burghersh on the other, telling their own story, I confess there appear to me strong reasons for believing, that the engagement at Brienne was *not* a "general affair;" that Napoleon himself was *not* in the action; and, consequently, that he could *not* be defeated. My view is, that it was the *rear* guard of the French army only that was engaged; that even this part of it *stood its* ground against the *united* and reiterated attacks of the *mair body* of the Allies; and that the movement which followed, of *withdrawing* it from its original position, was

the result of a *previous* determination on the part of Buonaparté, and not the consequence of its having been defeated. But before I proceed to notice the circumstances which, I think, warrant these conclusions, I request the reader to attend to the marked *discrepancy* which appears on comparing the French official accounts of the Brienne affair with those published in our Gazette. In the former we have a most interesting and particular detail of a battle fought on the 29th January, which was contested a whole day, and which terminated, after a great deal of hard fighting, in *favour* of the French, who thereby obtained possession of "the height of Partha," of "the castle of Brienne," and pursued the enemy "beyond the village de la Rothiere, "where they took their position."—In Lord Burghersh's and Sir Charles Stewart's dispatches, *not a single word* is said as to these important and *decisive* occurrences! It cannot be pretended that the enemy's accounts are mere gasconade, because we find it admitted in *our* official details, that they actually had possession of the places mentioned. Why, then, should Lord Burghersh and Sir Charles Stewart *suppress* the facts? Why should it be concealed, that the Allies had been *compelled* to give way before the enemy, and to *abandon* so many places of strength? Or, if they did transmit the particulars, why have they been kept back from the public, while every circumstance *prejudicial* to the enemy has been *anxiously* obtruded upon our notice?—Is not this *concealment* sufficient of itself to warrant the charge of deception practised by the public press, and to satisfy every rational person, that there is something wrong in the manner of giving out foreign intelligence?—How far it may influence the mind of the reader in judging of the credit due to what has been published here as *authentic*, it is for him to determine.—I shall now offer such observations as occur to me on a comparison of both statements, in so far as they relate to subsequent events.—I have said, that the engagement at Brienne was *not* a "general affair;" by which I mean, that the *whole* of Buonaparté's army did not take part in that action. It is stated, in the French bulletin, to have been only the *rear* guard that was engaged. "This day, in which our rear guard maintained itself in a vast plain against the whole of the enemy's army, and quintuple forces."—But I shall be told, that the *French* bulletin ought not to determine the fact. Very

well; be it so; let us see what Lord Burghersh says respecting it. "It appears," says his Lordship, "that Marshals Marmont, Mortier, and Victor were present in the action of this day. Generals Colbert and Grouchy were also present."

—Now, on turning to the French account, it will be seen, that the officers named by his Lordship were those attached to the rear guard of Buonaparté's army. It is true, he does not tell us explicitly what precise part of the enemy's army was in the battle; whether it was the right or the left, the centre or the rear; he speaks vaguely of a "general affair;" but when we see that the officers he names, were those who at the time actually did command the rear of the French army, and no other part of it, we cannot doubt the truth of Buonaparté's statement. —Had the entire force under the immediate command of Napoleon been in the action, Lord Burghersh would not only have mentioned this, but he would have dwelt upon it with exultation, as a circumstance demonstrative of the importance of the success, and of the little chance there was that Buonaparté would be again able to take the field. He prudently avoided this, which clearly shews that it was only a part, and not the whole of the French army that was engaged. In Colonel Lowe's letter to Sir Charles Stewart it is said, that "Buonaparté is supposed to have had the great body of his army collected." It is also said by Sir Charles himself, that "the enemy are supposed to have had about the same strength as the Allies." But mere supposition goes for nothing, when the object in view is to obtain an accurate knowledge of facts. I have further stated, that it was the main body of the Allies with which the rear guard of the enemy fought, and that, notwithstanding this, they stood their ground. The French bulletin distinctly says, that "the whole of the enemy's army and *quintuple* forces" were engaged. This statement may be somewhat exaggerated; but if Lord Burghersh's account be impartially considered, it will not be found to go far beyond the truth. His Lordship informs, that "General Blücher began his attack about 12 o'clock; the Prince of Wertemberg advanced about the same time; General Wrede arrived upon the right of the Prince Royal; General de Tollé formed the support of the different corps; and the Uhlans of Prince Schwartzburgh made a most successful charge." —Here we have an actual combination of the forces

of Russia, of Austria, of Prussia, and of Wertemberg; an attack upon the enemy by a large portion at least of the united armies of the Allies. This is estimated by Sir Charles Stewart at 70 or 80,000 men, and fully warrants my statement that the main body of the Allies were engaged. It was probably this circumstance which induced Lord Burghersh to denominate the affair a general one, for surely he could not mean that it was general as to Buonaparté's army, whose rear only was in the action. Now, let us see what the Allies accomplished by the overwhelming numbers which they brought into the field? Let us inquire whether they were really successful? whether they defeated the enemy? or rather whether they were not obliged to yield the palm of victory to the French? There are two dispatches from Lord Burghersh, the one dated the 1st and the other the 2d instant. In the former, his Lordship sets out with giving a view of the positions of the French army, prior to the attack of the Allies on the morning of the 1st. "It extended," says he, "across the plain from the front of Dienville on the right; by the village of La Rothière towards Tremilly on the left. In the front of the left, he occupied the village of La Gibrie, and the woods by which it was surrounded. In reserve, General Marmont was placed in the village of Morbillières. The heights also about the town of Brienne were occupied." Thus then it was, on the morning of the 1st instant: the French occupied the ground by, or near, the village of La Rothière, the village of La Gibrie, and the heights about the town of Brienne. This, it will be kept in mind, is not the French account of the matter; it is the account given by Lord Burghersh, a Lieutenant Colonel in our army, who writes from the spot, and who was himself a witness of the whole affair. It is besides corroborated by the letter of Colonel Lowe, who also was in the field of battle during the whole of the engagement. Having told us how the enemy was posted before the action, and I dare say they have been perfectly accurate as to this; let us now attend to the account given of their position after the action; let us see whether they were compelled materially to change that position, in consequence of the very formidable numbers brought against them, and these numbers led on by the redoubted General Blücher, supported by the combined military skill and talents of those celebrated officers Ge-

neral Barclay de Tolli, General Wrede, and the Prince Royal of Wertemburgh; and encouraged by the presence of the sovereigns of Russia and of Prussia. "Immediately after the battle commenced" (says Colonel Lowe) the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and Field Marshal Prince Schwartzburgh, came "on the ground." Neither Sir Charles Stewart, nor Colonel Lowe, mention any thing about the ground occupied by the enemy after the battle of the 1st. If indeed we are to believe the latter, who says he saw the whole affair, the victory of the Allies "was complete in every quarter;" which is as much as to say, that the French were *totally routed*, and driven from *all* their positions. Lord Burghersh, however, tells us a very different story. He says, "so ended the affair of this day; the enemy still held the ground beyond La Rothiere, and was still in possession, at the dark, of the heights of Brienne!!" I suppose the reader begins to think, that he has enough of my Lord Burghersh's "most glorious victory." He has seen the French rear guard, at the beginning of the action, in possession of *three* strong positions; he has beheld an attempt made by the *main body* of the Allies to drive them from these positions; he has found their most famous generals employed in this attempt, and nearly a whole day spent in endeavouring to make an impression upon them: yet he has seen that same enemy, that enemy so very *inferior* in number to their opponents, at the close of the day, occupying *two* of these positions. Even La Gibrice, the other position, was not, according to the French accounts, abandoned till the battle had *ceased*. "The Duke of Belluno (says the bulletin) maintained himself the *whole day* at the hamlet of La Gibrice, notwithstanding the enormous disproportion of his corps to the forces that attacked it." What then was there in all this to justify my Lord Burghersh's statement, that the Allies had gained a *most glorious victory*, or how could this affair have "crowned Marshal Blucher in the annals of fame?" Laying numbers altogether out of view; supposing, for a moment, that the enemy had as many men engaged as the Allies, I do not understand how the relinquishing by the former of a small *hamlet* at the end of the battle, can be held *glorious* to the latter, because we all know that the troops of the Allies are well disciplined veterans, flushed with victory, while those of the enemy

are raw conscripts, who never before were in battle, and who, as all the world knows, are so far from being hearty in the cause of the leader under whom they are fighting, that they detest and abhor him. It is thus that the public press speaks of Buonaparté and his army:—"The French army is *completely disorganized*; the old soldiers have been *victims* of the epidemic, or are *in the hospitals*; the conscripts are *without arms*; *dejection and discontent* are *at their height*. From the Marshal to the meanest soldier, *all* attribute the misfortunes of the two last campaigns, and the invasion of France, to the unmeasured ambition of their chief, and regard the passing events as a punishment from Heaven."—In these circumstances, the Allies ought not only to have *completely routed* the foe; to have recovered the positions whence they had *themselves* been driven; but to have *captured* their whole army. This was nothing more than what was to be looked for, considering the *condition* of the soldiers they had to encounter. But when it is seen that, with all these disadvantages on the part of the enemy, they were not only *not* driven from the field, but at the termination of the affair, "still held the ground beyond La Rothiere," were "still in possession at dark of the heights of Brienne;" what are we to think of those who could boast of this being, "a most glorious victory?" what are we to say of those who could discover nothing in all this but a signal defeat of Buonaparté? But, say these men, the Allies have taken "73 pieces of cannon, and about 4,000 prisoners from the enemy." What of that? Why did they not take *all* their cannon and *all* their men? Why did they not totally *annihilate* these *raw conscripts*; these "tall boys and old women?" Unless they can show that they did *that*, I say, they have done nothing to entitle them to thanks, and far less to claim the victory. But is it so very clear that the Allies took 4,000 prisoners? is it plain that the cannon of which they possessed themselves, were legitimate trophies, fairly won in the moment of battle? Buonaparté tells us, that at the close of the engagement which was fought on the 1st, "*few* prisoners have been made *on either side*; we have taken 250." Lord Burghersh says, in his account of the *same* affair, that "3,000 prisoners are already in the hands of the Allies." I shall not pretend to say which of these statements ought to be believed.

But I cannot help thinking it strange that all these prisoners, and all these cannon, should have been taken from the French, without the Allies *admitting* that they had a single man killed, or wounded, or a single prisoner taken. Lord Burghersh states, that there was much *hard fighting*; that the Allies were "strongly opposed," that the French made *repeated* attacks upon them, and were repulsed with *difficulty*. Was there nobody but Frenchmen that fell on this occasion? were the skins of the Cossacks impenetrable to shot? or had the *holy charm*, which every Russian carries with him to battle, so miraculous an effect on this occasion, that they neither lost leg nor arm? But, reader, let me not deceive you; for I find, on again casting my eyes over the very "satisfactory and accurate" letter of Colonel Lowe, that I was mistaken in supposing the Allies had neither killed nor wounded. I say, I find I was *mistaken* in this, because I have now discovered, what had formerly escaped my notice, that "A Cossack orderly of General Guissenau, was *shot* by his (Blucher's) "side." I suppose this unfortunate Cossack had either lost his *holy amulet*, or had neglected, in the morning, to offer up his prayers to St. Nicholas. He had certainly been guilty of some very great crime, that he, of all the thousands who had been exposed to the fire of the enemy, should be the only one that was slain. But, perhaps, Heaven intended by this to show how highly it favoured General Blucher, by directing the shot, which was probably pointed at the "hoary veteran," to the head or heart of the Cossack, whom it levelled with the dust. "If Europe be saved," says the *Courier*, "Blucher will be placed in the first rank of her savours!"—But let us now return to my Lord Burghersh. If we are to consider his Lordship's statement a *faithful* detail of what passed on the 1st instant, we shall be compelled to admit the power of the *holy charms* of the Russians. But if we do not; if we are to regard it as a mere *partial* account of the proceedings of that day, and that many things passed before him, things which others, who saw them, viewed as matters of importance, and which were really so: if, I say, his Lordship has told us only *half* the truth in one instance, how are we sure that he has told us the *whole* truth in every other? Or rather, believing that he did transmit a *full* detail of these occurrences, how are we sure, when we find that detail, as I have found it in

the *Times* and *Courier*, disfigured and mutilated, that any part of it is correct? Buonaparté has been accused of "mean spiritedness," of "whining," and of "cowardice," because he tells his subjects the *extent* of his losses, and does not *conceal* from them the dangers to which the country is exposed. But I would rather trust a man who tells me *all* the truth, however disagreeable that truth may be, than he who keeps back a part of it. The former, I am certain, knows how to practise *deceit*: the latter values himself upon being an *honest* man. It is from this view of matters, that I am inclined to believe the following account which Napoleon gives of the cause of the loss of his *cannon*, to be the *true* one:—"In the midst of "the obscurity of the night, a battery of "the artillery of the guard, following the "movements of a column of cavalry, which "was advancing to repulse a charge of the "enemy, lost its way, and was taken. "When the cannoniers perceived the ambush into which they had fallen, and "saw that they had not time to form their "battery, formed themselves in a squadron, attacked the enemy, and saved the "horses and harness. They lost fifteen "men killed or taken prisoners."—The reader will observe, that I have hitherto been speaking merely of the battle of the 1st. I shall notice what is said about the loss of both sides on the 2d, after I have stated my reasons for believing that Buonaparté was not *personally* engaged in the battle of Brienne, and that he afterwards drew off his troops from that quarter, not because they were routed, but because he had *previously* intended to do so. Lord Burghersh does not say, in as many words, that the French Emperor took a part in the action. He merely states, that Buonaparté placed his army so and so, that Buonaparté continued the action with considerable obstinacy, &c. All this we know he could have directed to be done, without leaving his head-quarters. Of the Russian general, Lord Burghersh speaks thus: "General "Blucher was present at the defence of this "village, and contributed materially by his "exertions in the repulse of the enemy." Here the person of Blucher is so completely identified with the occurrences of the day, that it is impossible to mistake his being present. But there is no such identity of Buonaparté; it is not said that he was present in any part of the action. If he had been on the spot, it cannot be believed that Lord Burghersh would have omitted noticing, and

that in the most *pointed* manner, a circumstance so well calculated, as the defeat of Napoleon in person, to enhance the value of the victory. Besides, it appears from the French bulletin that he actually was *not* there. "On the 28th the Emperor went to Montierender. On the 29th, at 8 in the morning, General Grouchy, who commands the cavalry, sent word that General Milhaud, &c."

—Here we find him at a distance from the scene of action, and one of his Generals sending him word as to the movements of the Allies, a step which would not have been necessary had he been *there* in person to observe them. It is no where said that Buonaparté left Montierender until the 3d instant, on the noon of which day we find he "entered Troyes."—But I shall be told that the fact of Buonaparté's *personal presence* is put beyond all doubt by the letter of Colonel Lowe, who appears to have been a witness of the whole transaction, and, therefore, it was but natural to expect that he would be able to tell us something *positive*, something *certain* as to Buonaparté.—"Colonel Lowe's detail" (says Sir C. Stewart) is so *satisfactory*, "and so *accurate*, from his having had the advantage of being with Marshal Blücher in the advance during the whole of the day."

—Let us see then what this very *accurate* Colonel, who saw every thing, says about the presence of Napoleon. He states, that "Buonaparté, in person, it is reported by the prisoners, led on the attack himself, at the head of the young guard, and had a horse shot under him."—So this is what Sir Charles Stewart calls *satisfactory* and *accurate* information. It is reported by the prisoners. Why not asserted by Colonel Lowe who was "in the advance during the whole day," and could not fail to see Buonaparté if he "led on the attack himself?"—It is either true that Buonaparté led on the attack himself, or it is unlikely that Colonel Lowe was in the advance during the whole day.—For the former of these statements, we have only the report of the Colonel to whom it was reported by some prisoners: neither he nor Sir Charles Wilson say that they believe the fact. But for the latter we have the positive assertion of both these officers. The fair and rational conclusion, therefore, is, that Buonaparté neither led on the attack himself, nor was present during any part of the action. The *Times* and the *Courier*, however, will have it that Buonaparté was "actively

"engaged," and the votaries of these lying idols, who would hold it *criminal* were they to entertain a *doubt* as to the veracity, are ready to exterminate every man who ventures to differ from them in opinion on this subject. With them the French bulletins contain nothing but "impudent falsehoods." Even our own official accounts are rejected, or thrown aside, if they come in contact with their favourite journals. But leaving these groveling insects to enjoy their fancied triumph, let us proceed, in the developement of the motives which induced Buonaparté to withdraw his rear guard from before Brienne. We have already seen that this was *not* because of a defeat, for at the close of the battle, as admitted by Lord Burghersh, "the enemy still held the ground beyond La Rothiere, and was still in possession, at the dark, of the heights of Brienne." Even "next morning" (i. e. the morning of the 2d instant) says his lordship, "his rear guard was in occupation of the position of Brienne." Those who have been in the practice of observing the military progress of Buonaparté, must have remarked, that he has been indebted for the greater part of his victories, to his *manœuvring*, and the promptness with which he executes all his designs. In fact, he calculates more upon the rapidity and variety of his movements, than upon any other circumstance.—These he knows tend to *embarrass* his opponents, to deceive them as to his ulterior views; and when he finds, as he commonly does, that he has bewildered them, that he has drawn their attention from the real object he has in view, he never fails to turn this to good account. The advantages which Napoleon had gained on the side of Brienne, prior to the 30th of January, though very decisive in their nature, seem to have been more the result of the impetuosity and enthusiastic courage of his troops, than of any regular plan of this nature. They had driven the Allies from several strong positions: but there were still others which the vast accumulation of force that every day brought to the Allied army, rendered much more formidable, and which Buonaparté, with his usual penetration, appears to have very soon discovered required something more than the native enthusiasm of his raw undisciplined soldiers to overcome. He, therefore, determined on concentrating his army, and effecting a junction of his different corps, which at that moment occupied separate positions, for the purpose of enabling him

to carry on operations in a quarter, where he had calculated upon acting with greater effect. That Buonaparté had formed this resolution *prior* to the battle of the 1st, appears to me clear from what is said in the official bulletin, which the reader will probably think with me, deserves as much credit as the very "satisfactory and accurate" letter of Colonel Lowe, of which we have already had so notable a specimen. "The 31st," says the bulletin, "was employed by us in repairing the bridge of Lesmont, on the Aube, the Emperor *intending to advance towards Troyes*, to operate upon the columns which directed their march by Bar-sur-Aube, and the road of Auxerre upon Sens. The bridge of Lesmont could not be repaired before the 1st of February in the morning; a *part of the troops were immediately made to file off.*" Here, then, it is distinctly stated, that Buonaparté had resolved on the 31st ult., if not before, to remove his headquarters to Troyes; to *advance*, not to *retreat*, as the *Courier* most impudently asserted. Not only had Napoleon adopted this resolution on that day, but he actually caused a part of his troops "immediately to file off."—These were the troops who had, only two days before, *defeated* the Allies, after a whole day's fighting, and driven them beyond Brienne. Instead of filing off in consequence of having been themselves beaten by the Allies; instead of retreating before a victorious army, they were retiring of their own accord, in compliance with the orders of their Generals who had cut out work for them in another quarter. The circumstance of the other divisions of Buonaparté's army having been previously in advance towards Troyes, at once accounts for this one being called the rear guard. It is true, neither Lord Burghersh, Sir Charles Stewart, nor Colonel Lowe tell us any thing of the intention of the French Emperor, nor of the actual movement of his troops on the 31st January. But I have already shewn, that the dispatches of these officers, as they appear in the *Gazette*, are *entirely silent* as to every thing that occurred *before* the 1st instant. The "most glorious victory" obtained on that day by the Allies was enough for them to think of. It gave them no leisure, even had they felt the inclination, to notice events which had proved glorious only to the enemy, and which they were not disposed to be the willing instruments of handing down to posterity. No, no; they knew the *taste* of "John Bull" better than

"be after such naughty tricks." But they could not conceal from the public, at least for any length of time, the fact as recorded by Buonaparté; neither could the attentive observer long remain ignorant, that the French rear guard had actually *begun its march* towards Troyes, *before* the allied army ventured, even with all its accumulation of force, to attack it. Napoleon foresaw that it was probable something might be attempted against this part of his army, and therefore he provided against it. We have seen what was the result. *Not* the defeat and dispersion of the enemy; no compelling them to abandon their positions; but, on the contrary, a *complete repulsion* of the main body of the united army of Russia, of Austria, of Prussia, and of Wertemburgh, acting under the immediate command of their most celebrated Generals, and encouraged by the presence of the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, the Prince Royal of Wertemburgh, and the never to be forgotten Prince Schwarzenburgh, who, in person, received, on this occasion, a sword from the Emperor Alexander, for the *skill* and *talent* he had "displayed in bringing the troops under his orders to the *brilliant situation*" which they then occupied.—Mark, reader, the *brilliant situation* of troops, who had endeavoured for nearly a whole day, but *in vain*, to compel the rear guard of Buonaparté's army to abandon its positions.—But, then, though the Allies could not, with 80,000 men, force this *incorrigible* rear guard to move an inch, they took "75 pieces of cannon and about 4,000 prisoners" from them. We have already seen, that it was *not* by fighting, but by *accident*, that the Allies got possession of a great proportion, at least, of these cannon. We have also seen it *positively asserted* by Buonaparté, that, at the termination of the battle of the 1st, "few prisoners were made on either side."—The affair of the 1st had created a *pause* in the movement of the enemy's rear. But after the action was over; early in the morning of the 2d, it again began to file off. "His columns," says Lord Burghersh, "appear to have begun their movement to the rear, about one in the morning." "It successively took positions" (says the French bulletin) to finish passing the bridge of Lesmont and *rejoining the rest of the army.*" It was at this critical moment that the Allies again resolved to renew the attack. They saw the rear guard *separated* from the main body

of Napoleon's army; they observed its exposed situation, occasioned by the necessity there was of changing its front, and of contracting its files, in order to effect the passage of a narrow bridge. Taking advantage of these circumstances, and while part of the French division were actually "in position upon the bridge of Rosnay," it was "attacked by an Austrian corps which had passed behind the woods." It cannot be surprising, then, if a part of the French division, which must have remained on the Brienne side of the bridge of Rosnay; which must have been isolated from the mass of the rear guard that had either crossed or was "in position upon the bridge." It will not, I say, appear extraordinary if some of those troops which were surprised by the Austrian corps that had been concealed from view by the woods, were taken prisoners, and that a considerable number of them were killed and wounded. The French bulletin states their loss in the two days at from 2 to 3,000 killed or wounded; and adds, "that of the enemy has at least been double." Our dispatches, on the other hand, do not acknowledge the loss of a single man on the part of the Allies; except, indeed, we admit, that the "orderly Cossack," who fell by the side of Blucher, ought to be considered a person slain in battle, and not by the hand of St. Nicholas, as a punishment for losing his holy amulet, or for having impiously neglected to offer up prayers to that Saint. Which of the statements are to be adopted as the most correct, the reader will be at no loss to determine, from what I have already said. For my part, I cannot refuse my assent to the leading facts stated in the French bulletin, because that statement appears perfectly open, natural, and consistent; whereas, on the other side, there is an obvious concealment of some of the most important results, which is sufficient, in my apprehension, to create a doubt as to the truth of the whole.

Occurrences of the War.—Dispatches have been received from Lord Burghersh, dated Troyes, the 8th instant, from

which it appears, that the Allies entered that place on the 7th, in consequence of Buonaparté having left it the night before, and proceeded to Nogent. Troyes is about 95 miles from Paris, and Nogent 70. The following French official bulletin, which has been confirmed by the arrival of Paris papers to the 15th instant, shows that Napoleon has again commenced offensive operations, and that these have been attended with very considerable success. The engagement took place near Chateau Thierry.—"Paris, Feb. 12. (Telegraphic Dispatch.) The day before yesterday, Feb. 10, the Emperor completely defeated a Russian corps near Sezanne. The General was taken, and his Staff, forty cannon, 6,000 men, all the caissons, the baggage and materiel. Yesterday, the 11th, the Emperor completely defeated and put to rout the corps of General Sacken, of whom he has taken 50 pieces of cannon, and 10,000 men."

The negotiations are still going on at Chatillon, whence dispatches were received from Lord Castlereagh, dated the 10th. The *Morning Post* says, "that Lord Castlereagh has recommended to his colleagues the measure of peace with Buonaparté, whose authority is most unfortunately ascertained to be unshaken, and his means of carrying on the war ample enough to discourage the hope of breaking down or overthrowing his power;" "that the allied powers have found the enemy much stronger than they expected; and that unless we become parties, not only in the negotiations, but to the treaty which they are concluding, we expose ourselves to the charge of being considered as the sole obstacles to peace, and being left alone to bear the burdens of an exhausting war, which we might have closed with safety and honour." It is said by the *Morning Chronicle*, that the *Morning Post* is the government demi-official journal, as the *Courier*, which deprecates all intercourse with the "Assassin of one of the Bourbon Princes," is that which belongs to Carlton House.

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